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1. Introduction 
The year 2007 marked the beginning of the worst financial crisis since the Great 
Depression. Most of the world’s largest banks were on the verge of bankruptcy 
and survived only due to unprecedented bailout measures. Currently, regulators, 
shareholders, and managers are searching for measures to avoid such a crisis in 
the future. One of the most prominent proposals is the introduction of salary caps 
for corporate executives. The European Union has introduced caps on bankers’ 
bonuses, which will be in effect starting in 2011. The US House of 
Representatives has ordered regulators to set compensation rules, just as the 
Federal Reserve is pushing for a modification of top executive compensation, 
especially in the banking sector.  
The objective of executive pay arrangements is the alignment of 
shareholder and executive interests.1 Research focuses on executive compensation 
as an instrument to overcome agency problems.2 The recent financial crisis and 
the related bailout measures suggest that discussion of executive compensation 
should also include the eventual consequences of firm behavior on taxpayers and 
society. Potential instruments to moderate the relationship between executives, 
shareholders, and taxpayers, e.g., pay limits or taxes on excessive compensation, 
have not received much attention from research.3 Although executive pay played 
an important role in the recent financial crisis, academic research has not analyzed 
the desired attributes, mechanisms, and implementation issues of pay regulation in 
corporations so far.  
The scarce research on executive pay regulation yields few implications 
for academic research as well as for implementation in practice. Professional 
sports leagues, with their experience in determining, implementing and enforcing 
salary caps and luxury taxes, pose a unique resource for deriving insights into 
how a sector operates a compensation-related regulatory regime. In this paper, we 
illustrate what regulators, shareholders and managers can learn from pay 
regulation in major sports leagues. We analyze regulation through salary caps and 
luxury taxes in professional sports leagues, and discuss potential implications for 
executive pay regulation. In sports, salary caps, i.e. the maximum amount a team 
can spend on player salaries, and luxury taxes, i.e. taxes on excess salary 
payments, have a long tradition. Examples of sports leagues with salary regulation 
are numerous: the National Basketball Association (NBA), the National Football 
League (NFL) and the National Hockey League (NHL) each have a salary cap. 
1 Jensen and Murphy 1990; Bebchuk and Fried 2003. 
2 For surveys of the vast number of contributions, see Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman 1997; Murphy 
1999; Core, Guay and Larcker 2003; Devers, Cannella, Reilly and Yoder 2007. 
3 See Bebchuk and Spamann 2010 and Faulkender, Kadyrzhanova, Prabhala and Senbet 2010, for 
two of the few examples. 
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Major League Baseball (MLB), as well as the NBA, has implemented a luxury 
tax. 
In our analysis, we employ the analogy between professional team sports 
and corporations, where we consider team owners and shareholders, and star 
athletes and corporate executives as analogues. It has been argued that athletes 
and corporate executives are comparable in terms of the impact that they have on 
their respective organizations and the conflict of interest they face in performing 
their functions.4 We investigate this argument further by analyzing pay regulation 
in the labor market of major sports leagues and discussing potential insights for 
executive pay regulation. A number of researchers have recognized the 
professional sports industry as a potential labor market laboratory.5 The 
transparency and the data availability of the sports industry (regarding 
compensation and performance) make professional sports a valuable resource for 
testing economic propositions.6 Additionally, authors analyzing management-
related and economic issues in the context of sports frequently state that the 
simple institutional framework in sports can provide a contribution on managerial 
and economic issues in other institutions, despite the specificity of the data 
employed in a particular study.7 Previous studies that derive insights for the 
corporate sector from professional sports are numerous and cover a wide range of 
topics. Wolfe et al. (2005) provide a comprehensive analysis of studies in the 
field of organization and management that draw on observations from the sports 
sector, covering topics such as competitive advantage, stakeholder management, 
and team performance. In the economics literature, professional sports have also 
served as a context to derive implications on a broad range of issues, reaching 
from firm decision making8 over team compensation dispersion9 to economic 
incentives for crime and corruption.10  
In this paper, we analyze major North American sports leagues to attain 
the following research objectives: we show how the sector-specific idiosyncrasies 
of professional team sports have fostered pay regulation, and illustrate 
fundamental practices and consequences of pay regulation in major sports 
leagues. Further, we derive insights from regulation practices in professional 
sports and discuss, in how far these insights can and cannot be transferred to the 
corporate sector. In particular, we analyze to what extent self-regulation initiatives 
can improve the financial stability of a sector and mitigate external interventions. 
4 Kaplan and O'Reilly 2008. 
5 See, e.g., Kahn 2000; Rosen and Sanderson 2001; Szymanski 2003. 
6 Lazear 1995; Kahn 2000. 
7 See Duggan and Levitt 2002, for example. 
8 Romer 2006. 
9 Bloom 1999; Frick, Prinz and Winkelmann 2003; Franck and Nüesch 2010. 
10 Duggan and Levitt 2002; Levitt 2002. 
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Our analysis further shows that collective bargaining over compensation can 
reduce managerial power in the pay-setting process and mitigates the necessity for 
external intervention. We also establish that pay regulation contingent on 
performance in combination with retained compensation is the more effective 
regulatory model compared to an absolute cap on compensation. We further show 
that pay regulation of collectives yields a trade-off between the desired regulatory 
effect and firms’ autonomy of setting individual compensation. A comparison of 
salary caps and luxury taxes shows that luxury taxes can be an advantageous 
alternative to salary caps. Luxury taxes reduce the net benefit of excessive 
compensation. Additionally, they lead to less distortions than salary caps and 
generate resources for redistribution. Contrasting hard and soft regulation, we find 
that soft regulation is less effective in limiting compensation but can provide 
additional incentives.  
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. The proceeding 
section presents a short overview of the central attributes of athlete and corporate 
executive compensation, as well as current pay regulation in professional team 
sports and traditional business sectors. Following that, we approach selected 
regulatory issues in professional sports leagues and discuss, in how far the 
insights gained from experience in sports leagues can and cannot be transferred to 
executive compensation in the corporate sector. The final section concludes. 
2. Overview of compensation practices and regulation in professional team 
sports and in the corporate sector
2.1 Compensation practices in professional sports and the corporate sector 
In this section, we provide a brief overview of the central pay components of 
professional athletes and corporate executives and address the different weight 
they have in the respective compensation arrangements. As pay regulation both 
influences and the regulation’s effectiveness depends on the structure of 
compensation, this should serve as an outline of what we refer to as compensation 
in the course of this article. Kaplan and O’Reilly (2008) have analyzed the 
relationship between CEO and Star Athlete compensation. They find that the pay 
of executives and athletes is similar in the amount, but significantly differs in 
structure. Executives are compensated in the main part via variable forms of pay. 
There are a number of variable compensation instruments, e.g., bonus payments, 
restricted stock grants, grants of stock options, and long-term incentive payouts. 
The variable elements amount to between 60% and 80% of total compensation, 
depending on the sector and the measure applied.11,12 In particular, the financial 
11 Brookman, Jandik and Rennie 2006; Aggarwal 2008; S&P ExecuComp data for the fiscal years 
2007-2009. 
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sector shows a very high percentage of variable, performance-related 
compensation.13  
Compensation in the corporate sector is considerably more complex than 
in professional sports, where athletes’ pay is mostly a fixed salary, with only a 
minor variable part. In particular, compensation in professional sports consists of 
a fixed annual salary and of variable pay in the form of team and individual 
bonuses. Compared to the corporate sector, variable pay in professional sports is 
relatively small, accounting for between five and 25 percent of total player 
earnings in the NFL in recent seasons, for example.14 In other major sports 
leagues, this percentage is equally small, and frequently restricted to a small 
proportion of players.15,16 The NBA distinguishes between performance pay that 
is tied to objectives, which are likely to be achieved, and pay that is tied to 
objectives, which are unlikely to be achieved. For example, a player can be 
expected to increase his scoring average by half a point per game in a season, but 
it is unlikely that he increases it by five points per game. Sign-in bonuses, which 
are fixed payments players receive when they sign a new contract with a team, 
constitute a further compensation component. Sign-in bonuses are frequently used 
in the NFL, but are not common in other major leagues.  
After this overview of the pay components and the differences of 
compensation arrangements in professional team sports and in the corporate 
sector, we next outline central attributes of pay regulation in both sectors. This 
outline provides the starting point for deriving insights from specific regulation 
practices in major sports leagues, and the discussion of their transferability to the 
corporate sector in the section covering insights on pay regulation from major 
sports leagues.  
12 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for bringing the relative proportions of fixed and 
performance-based pay in executive pay to our attention.  
13 See Murphy 1999. Compared to professional team sports, where athlete performance is 
observable, an executive’s contribution to firm performance is less transparent. Most empirical 
studies thus focus on executive compensation and firm performance, and not individual 
performance (see Murphy 1985; 1986; Jensen and Murphy 1990; Gibbons and Murphy 1992); 
Bushman, Indjejikian and Smith 1996 outline the problems related to individual executive 
performance and compensation.  
14 Mondello and Maxcy 2009. 
15 Clayton and Yermack 2001; Heubeck and Scheuer 2003. 
16 In the NHL, only players on entry-level contracts, on one-year contracts, or players returning 
from long-term injuries can receive performance pay, for example.  
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2.2 Pay regulation in the professional team sports industry 
The professional team sports industry is characterized by a number of economic 
peculiarities.17 In particular, two peculiarities have led to the regulation of player 
salaries: the importance of competitive balance and the ruinous escalation of 
player salaries.18 First, there is a difference in professional sports between athletic 
and economic competition. From an athletic perspective, opposing teams are 
competitors. From an economic perspective, however, they are complementors. A 
single team cannot produce a marketable product. It needs at least one opponent. 
In team sports, leagues aggregate a number of teams and matches to produce a 
championship race. Fans prefer to attend matches with an uncertain outcome and 
enjoy close championship races.19 Unlike enterprises such as General Electric, 
Wal-Mart, or Microsoft, which benefit from weak competitors in their respective 
industries, the New York Yankees, the Los Angeles Lakers and Real Madrid need 
strong competitors to maximize their revenues. 
A further economic peculiarity of professional team sports is the 
associative character of competition. No club can improve its position in the ranks 
without simultaneously worsening the position of at least one other team. The 
position of a team in the ranks is closely related to the team’s financial success 
because teams with a better position receive more attention from fans, the media, 
sponsors, etc. The rank-order contest between teams may result in a rat race.20 As 
Whitney (1993) shows, teams tend to overbid each other for playing talent until 
they are close to bankruptcy. Recent developments in club finance in European 
football support this hypothesis. Many clubs are facing financial ruin after 
gambling on spiraling wages.21 
The economic peculiarities of the sports sector have led to the introduction 
of pay regulation in the major sports leagues. Salary caps and luxury taxes, which 
are a surcharge on the part of a team’s payroll that exceeds a salary threshold, 
emerged in the US major leagues with the introduction of free agency and were 
installed as a counterforce to free player movement.22,23 The introduction of salary 
caps and luxury taxes through collective bargaining agreements leads to an 
17 Neale 1964. 
18 Fort and Quirk 1995; Szymanski 2003. 
19 See Rottenberg 1956; Szymanski 2001; Borland and MacDonald 2003; Fort and Lee 2007. 
20 Akerlof 1976. 
21 Arnaut 2006; Dietl and Franck 2007; Deloitte and Touche 2009. 
22 Fort and Quirk 1995; Dietl, Franck, Lang and Rathke 2011; Dietl, Lang and Rathke 2011. 
23 The reserve clause was introduced in baseball in 1887 and gave club owners an exclusive option 
to unilaterally renew the annual contracts of their players, binding them to their clubs until release, 
retirement or trade. In contrast, “free agents“ are players for whom no compensation is required 
and/or the original team has no matching rights. Therefore, free agents can freely offer their 
services to other teams. 
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exemption of these measures from antirust action. Despite this exemption, major 
sports leagues are often considered as profit-maximizing cartels, where pay 
regulation transfers rents from players to owners.  
Currently, all four North American major team sports leagues have a 
salary cap and/or luxury tax. The NBA in 1983 became the first league to 
introduce a salary cap, and has a salary cap of US$ 57.7 million for the 2009/10 
season. This cap limits the mount of money a team may spend on player salaries. 
In recent years, the salary cap has increased proportionally to the increase in the 
NBA’s revenues. The NBA salary cap is a so-called “soft” cap, meaning that in 
contrast to a “hard” cap, there are several exceptions that allow teams to exceed 
the salary cap to sign players. These exceptions are mainly designed to enable 
teams to retain popular players. In 1999, the NBA also introduced a luxury tax 
system for those teams with an average team payroll exceeding the salary cap by a 
predefined amount. These teams have to pay a 100% tax to the league for each 
dollar that their payroll exceeds the tax level. In the NFL, the “hard” salary cap in 
2009 was US$ 128 million per team. The NHL operates with a hard salary cap 
such that each team had to spend less than US$ 56.8 million on player salaries in 
the 2009/10 season. The MLB does not have a salary cap. However, Major 
League Baseball became the first league to introduce a luxury tax in 1996 as part 
of its collective bargaining agreement. The threshold at which the luxury tax 
accrues was US$ 162 million per team in the 2009 season. It is important to note 
that there is significant heterogeneity between the major leagues regarding the 
design of salary caps.24  
There is wide agreement in the literature that salary caps and luxury taxes 
improve competitive balance in sports leagues because they prevent wealthy clubs 
with high market potential from bidding the full marginal value for additional 
talent.25 This effect allows less wealthy, small-market clubs to retain star players. 
Additionally, salary caps can enhance social welfare when they limit large teams’ 
spending.26 Moreover, a salary cap balances the salary distribution between 
players and increases club profits.27 The welfare effect of luxury taxes is positive 
because league quality increases as a result of the combination of luxury taxes and 
redistribution of luxury tax proceeds.28 However, teams have incentives to 
circumvent regulation through salary caps and luxury taxes, therefore monitoring 
and enforcement activities are necessary.29  
24 Individual caps, rookie caps, etc.; for a comprehensive overview see, e.g., Kaplan 2004. 
25 Fort and Quirk 1995; Rosen and Sanderson 2001. 
26 Dietl, Lang and Rathke 2009. 
27 Késenne 2000. 
28 Dietl, Lang and Werner 2010. 
29 Fort and Quirk 1995; Dobson and Goddard 2001. 
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2.3 Overview of status quo of pay regulation in the corporate sector 
In this subsection, we outline the main measures that are currently installed to 
regulate executive compensation to provide a basis for the discussion of insights 
from regulation practices in professional team sports. Up until the recent financial 
crisis, regulatory measures concerning executive pay could be summed up under 
disclosure requirements and intervention via taxes.30 Disclosure regulation serves 
to increase transparency of executive compensation by requiring detailed listing 
of compensation packages, their components and levels. Research shows that 
increased disclosure enhances shareholder wealth.31 Tax regulation serves to 
disincentivize excessive compensation by making compensation above a 
threshold increasingly costly for corporations. One prominent example for such 
regulation is the tax deductibility limit of US$1 million for corporations.32 This 
limit is accompanied by several exceptions, e.g., compensation for performance 
goals set by a corporation’s compensation committee and approved by a majority 
of shareholders is not included in the deductibility limit. Payments deferred until 
retirement also are not included in the limit. Note that as a consequence to taxes 
on stock options, employee options are frequently granted as non-qualified 
options, which allows a compensation-expense deduction for corporations.33  
In addition to disclosure and tax regulation, a number of corporate 
governance requirements, e.g., incorporated in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 
affect executive compensation:34 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act disallows loans from 
corporations to their executives, sanctions erroneous financial statements, and 
requires independent compensation committees. As a result of these measures, 
affected corporations lowered executive pay considerably, mostly via reducing 
compensation via options rather than remuneration in cash.35 Another regulatory 
intervention regarding corporate governance is the introduction of (mandatory or 
voluntary) “say on pay“. Say on pay increases shareholder influence on executive 
compensation by mandating a shareholder vote over executive pay. However, 
studies have found limited evidence that say on pay notably alters the level and 
design of CEO compensation.36  
The recent financial crisis and related government bailouts entailed a 
number of short-term regulations, particularly for financial institutions that have 
benefitted from the government’s support via bailouts.37 The American Recovery 
30 Knutt 2005. 
31 Lo 2003. 
32 Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC). 
33 Hall and Murphy 2003. 
34 Dew-Becker 2009. 
35 Chhaochharia and Grinstein 2007. 
36 See Conyon and Sadler 2010, for example. 
37 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. 
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and Reinvestment Act limits incentive pay via restricted stock at one-third of an 
executive’s total annual compensation, and the vesting period for the restricted 
stock must last until a firm has paid back the received bailout money, for 
example. 
3. Insights on pay regulation from major sports leagues 
This article examines regulation practices in the professional team sports industry 
and derives insights for the corporate sector. We have shown how the necessity 
for regulation in professional team sports comes from two peculiarities of the 
sports sector: the preference for balanced competition and the consequences of a 
rank-order tournament.  
To the extent that the basic rationales for pay regulation in the sports 
industry have a corresponding counterpart in the corporate sector, i.e., there is an 
interrelatedness of firm objectives and there are collectively harmful races for 
individual returns, the discussion of pay regulation in professional team sports can 
generate immediate insights for the controversy over executive pay regulation. In 
settings, where such correspondence does not exist, comparative analysis of 
professional sports and the corporate sector has to establish, where insights from 
sports can and cannot be transferred to the corporate sector, and indicate potential 
consequences of a transfer. In general, competitors in other sectors than 
professional team sports do not prefer balanced competition, but want to 
outperform their competitors. Only in specific settings, competitors are also 
complementors. For example, liquid financial institutions have incentives to 
support their competitors, for instance by private bailouts, to avoid contagion 
from illiquid banks.38 Kaufman (1994) states that bank failure contagion and its 
potential damage has given several experts a reason to call for government 
regulation in the banking sector.39 The concept of contagion and the related 
systemic risk imply that in sectors, which are potentially affected, there is an 
interest in maintaining a certain level of competitive balance between 
competitors.40 The rank-order tournament observed in sports leagues only exists 
to a limited degree in the corporate sector. Firms, by outperforming their 
competitors, can effect favorable reactions on the stock market, which gives them 
a relative advantage over their competitors. To the degree that firms’ 
competitiveness is determined by their relative stock market performance, the 
corporate sector shows similarities to the rank-order tournament that characterizes 
professional sports. Corporations may find themselves in races for maximizing 
38 Leitner 2005. 
39 See Corrigan 1982, for example. 
40 Note that competitive balance generally plays a role in the analysis of regulatory questions in 
concentrated industries, where the regulator addresses public interest by limiting market power. 
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upside potentials of risk, with potentially harmful consequences.41 By regulating 
compensation, the discrepancy between upside and downside potentials can be 
mitigated. These observations show that there are instances, particularly when 
there is a tendency towards instability in a sector as observed in the credit crunch 
related to the recent financial crisis, where regulation of the corporate sector 
follows a similar logic as regulation in professional team sports.  
Beyond such instances, the insights can be valuable as a starting point for 
discussing the applicability and potential effects of existing and prospective 
regulatory measures in the corporate sector. Because of the difficulties to draw 
meaningful conclusions from recent approaches to executive compensation,42
deriving conclusions via the analysis of a laboratory is an attractive approach. 
While the findings from these experiments cannot always be easily generalized, 
the available data and the related transparency of mechanisms at work makes 
professional sports a valuable source of insights.43 In the following, we analyze 
the defining regulation practices in major sports leagues. We discuss, where the 
insights obtained from professional sports can and cannot be transferred to the 
corporate sector, and point out potential implications of these insights for the 
corporate sector.  
3.1 (Self-) Imposed rules and strict sanctions in case of transgressions ensure the 
common benefit of competitors  
Consider the following anecdote of an Englishman observing the process of 
riverboat towing in 19th century China. At that time, wooden boats were used to 
carry natural resources from inland China downstream to large coastal cities. 
After unloading, the empty boats were pulled back upstream by a group of men 
from the riverbank using a large tow. The Englishman was surprised when he saw 
that the men where whipped whenever they slacked down in their towing effort. 
He was shocked, however, when he learned that the men pulling the boat actually 
were the owners of the boat and had agreed to hire a monitor to whip them 
whenever necessary.44 
Owners of professional sports teams face a similar dilemma as the 
riverboat towers. The owners benefit from fan attention, and to generate and 
maintain interest in sports competition, they want to ensure balanced competition. 
Consequently, different teams’ payrolls and the resulting talent levels should be 
similar. Apart from this collective objective, individual team owners profit from a 
high league rank of their team. Because of the rank-order contest in professional 
41 Faulkender et al. 2010. 
42 Devers et al. 2007. 
43 Lazear 1995. 
44 Cheung 1983. 
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team sports, the threat of an arms race emerges. So while the collective of club 
owners prefers balanced competition, each individual club owner tries to hire 
more talent by increasing his/her team’s payroll in an effort to move up in the 
ranking. In the end, all owners end up with higher payrolls without improving 
their individual ranks. Like the Chinese riverboat towers, club owners are aware 
of the dangers of abandoning common objectives and impose restrictions on 
themselves, for example the regulation of players’ salaries.45 They are also aware 
that each owner has an incentive to circumvent these payroll restrictions. 
Consequently, they also install a monitor, the league authority, to ensure that the 
restrictions will be enforced.46 
Major sports leagues have reacted to the awareness that their business 
model can only be successful in the long run if they maintain self-imposed 
restrictions. In contrast to the corporate sector, the closed structure of major sports 
leagues additionally favors the effectiveness of self-regulation. Major sports 
leagues are focused on a small, homogeneous geographic region, and team 
composition within a league is very stable. The coordinated self-regulation of 
teams in major sports leagues leads to financial stability as well as solid rents for 
owners and players.47 Teams understand that the collective discipline of a number 
of parties with similar interests is necessary to provide a basis for this successful 
coordination and therefore are willing to yield some of their autonomy.48  
When a sports team exceeds the salary cap - and the excess does not fall 
under one of the exceptions in the case of a soft salary cap - sanctions come into 
effect. Sanctions for rule violations are severe once a positive proof is obtained. 
The punishment may take on several forms: from financial penalties over 
suspension of the involved player to the loss of draft rights for one or more 
seasons. Professional team sports show that salary caps are only effective to the 
extent that they are well defined and enforceable.49 Salary caps are circumvented 
frequently, and circumvention attempts are various.50 Examples are the 
postponing of actual salaries to the future by signing undervalued contracts for a 
period of time until one of the salary cap exceptions allows high-value contracts, 
and teams underreporting revenues to pay lower salaries to their players.51  
Professional sports teams are in a unique position with respect to 
employment opportunities for star athletes. No sports league (in the disciplines of 
American football, baseball, basketball, and ice hockey) outside North America 
45 Fort and Quirk 1995. 
46 Franck 2003. 
47 Fort 2003. 
48 For an analysis of potential anticompetitive consequences of professional sports leagues as joint 
ventures, see Flynn and Gilbert 2001. 
49 Dietl, Franck and Nuesch 2006. 
50 Fort and Quirk 1995. 
51 E.g., Quirk 1997; Staudohar 1998. 
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can compete with the major leagues financially and with respect to public 
attention. Consequently, star players do not have significant outside options. 
LeBron James of the Miami Heat cannot simply leave the NBA and join another 
league without suffering major income losses. Teams outside the NBA cannot 
offer the same level of compensation.52 Professional athletes thus show lower 
salary elasticity than executives, and a decrease in salary does not necessarily lead 
to immediate exit to a foreign league. In contrast, a bank executive could easily 
escape compensation regulation by starting to work for a bank, which is not 
regulated.  
Corporations can learn from the benefits of self-regulation in professional 
team sports. With respect to pay regulation, firms and executives face similar 
incentives as those faced by professional sports teams and players. Executives 
prefer higher to lower pay, and firms want to attract and retain the best executives 
available, which requires offering the highest compensation among all 
competitors. Consequently, circumventing the salary cap, although possibly 
harmful in a larger context, may be in the interest of both parties. This yields an 
exemplary situation of a moral hazard.53 Circumvention can be achieved by 
spotting and exploiting potential loopholes in the salary cap mechanisms or by 
taking actions incompliant to defined rules, such as concealed agreements over 
side-payments or non-monetary compensation.  
Corporations generally have concerns about regulation because of a loss of 
autonomy and the danger of an exit of executives to other economies. To mitigate 
the effects of external regulation, self-regulation of sectors analogous to the 
practice in major sports leagues could be an alternative to government 
intervention. Self-regulation by sectors, for example the banking sector, already is 
common practice.54 An extension of self-regulation to executive compensation 
could reduce the necessity of extensive government intervention. However, self-
regulation initiatives for corporate governance by the European Union have 
shown that they can be successful only if mandatory compliance, monitoring and 
enforcement accompany the initiatives.55 
To ensure adherence to the salary cap and secure its stabilizing effects, a 
regulatory entity has to install well-defined rules and enforce compliance with the 
salary cap. This becomes the more difficult, the more complex pay arrangements 
are. Executive compensation shows more components than athlete pay, which 
makes it more difficult to control total remuneration.56 Exhaustive categorization 
52 According to www.forbes.com, James earned US$ 40m in 2009, of which US$ 16m were salary 
payments by his team. 
53 Holmstrom 1982. 
54 Chatov 1975; Gunningham 1991; Gunningham and Rees 1997. 
55 De Jong, DeJong, Mertens and Wasley 2005. 
56 Bebchuk and Fried 2006; Kaplan and O'Reilly 2008. 
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and publication of compensation components is therefore necessary to enable 
effective regulation and address potential loopholes that are not in the regulator’s 
interest.57  
The effectiveness of regulation in major sports leagues strongly depends 
on the coordination of individual teams to establish and enforce regulatory 
arrangements. For the corporate sector this implies that strong coordination efforts 
are vital for effective regulation, self-imposed as well as external, of business 
sectors and national economies, e.g., to limit outside options for executives by 
international implementation of regulatory measures.58 Compared to professional 
sports leagues, the difficulty of coordinating business sectors, or even entire 
economies, limits the extent to which the insights on self-regulation from 
professional sports can be transferred to the corporate sector. Nevertheless, 
regulators have undertaken various coordination efforts in the recent past. The 
2009 G-20 summit, which had salary caps for executive compensation on its 
agenda, is one example of concerted effort to avoid executive migration away 
from regulated economies.  
3.2 Collective bargaining ensures sustainable operations 
In professional team sports, salary caps and luxury taxes are established via 
collective bargaining agreements between the players’ union and the team 
owners. Both sides negotiate general work conditions, including the maximum 
(and in some cases minimum) percentage of league revenues, which players can 
receive as salaries.59 As this percentage is established via a collective agreement, 
antitrust law cannot be applied to the bargaining outcome, including the salary 
regulations.60 Many other ways of regulating salaries, such as the dictation of 
salary caps by team owners, would be prohibited by antitrust law.61  
The North American major leagues show that collective bargaining 
between principals and high-income agents can ensure sustainable levels of 
compensation as well as financial stability of a league and its teams. The 
collective bargaining process allows both team owners and players to voice their 
interests and continue the bargaining until they reach a bilateral agreement. Their 
small number, as well as their homogeneous interests, gives team owners an 
advantageous bargaining position opposite to the players, who face more 
coordination problems because of their number and the resulting range of 
interests. In contrast, player talent shows low substitutability and supply of skilled 
57 See, e.g., Posner 2009 and Faulkender et al. 2010. 
58 As addressed by Acharya, Wachtel and Walter 2009. 
59 Késenne 2007. 
60 Jacobs and Winter 1971; Marburger 1997. 
61 Rosner and Shropshire 2004. 
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labor in the past was limited, which gave the players an advantage.62 However, at 
present major sports leagues’ increasingly global sourcing of playing talent 
worsens players’ bargaining position. In the case that agreements on a salary cap 
or luxury tax cannot be established, a strike (by the players) or lockout (by the 
teams) may occur. This can result in the partial or entire loss of a season, as has 
occurred in the recent past, for example in the 1998/99 NBA and 2004/05 NHL 
lockouts.63 The forgone earnings related to lockouts pressure both team owners 
and players to reach an agreement. 
Executive pay in the corporate sector usually follows recommendations 
from different parties (management, human resource department, outside 
accountants, compensation consultants) and is either accepted or rejected by the 
compensation committee, which consists mainly of outside directors.64 There 
exists concern about a lack of independence of compensation committees, as well 
as the influence of managerial power on executive compensation.65 Collective 
bargaining in major sports leagues provides insights for executive compensation 
in the corporate sector. Collective bargaining between shareholders on the one 
side of the bargaining table, and executives on the other, increases direct 
shareholder participation in the setting of executive compensation and reduces 
managerial power in the compensation setting process. Therefore, collective 
bargaining yields more transparent outcomes for the shareholders. However, there 
is an important caveat to the transfer of the insights on collective bargaining to 
executive compensation: if shareholders and executives collectively bargained 
over compensation arrangements, they would not automatically include 
perspectives outside the scope of their interests. Regulatory intervention would 
thus still be necessary to eliminate incentives with potentially harmful external 
effects. The regulator, as the controlling instance, has to ensure that shareholders 
and executives do not disregard taxpayer interests, for example.  
The bargaining parties in professional sports leagues are team owners and 
players. For the corporate sector, the choice of bargaining parties is not obvious. 
Collective bargaining could take place between shareholders and executives 
within one firm, within one sector, or within national or international boundaries. 
The coordination costs of a collective bargaining process rise with the spread and 
sector specificity of bargaining parties. The regulator would have to address this 
conflict between coordination costs and the comprehensiveness of the bargaining 
outcome. Another issue in the transfer of the insight that collective bargaining can 
be applied to executive compensation is the bargaining power of the participating 
parties: a small number of executives face a large number of shareholders. 
62 Rosen and Sanderson 2001. 
63 Staudohar 1999; 2005. 
64 Murphy 1999. 
65 Murphy 1999; Bebchuk, Fried and Walker 2002. 
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Additionally, executives’ interests are very homogeneous. These aspects 
contribute to a favorable bargaining position of executives and would therefore 
impact the bargaining outcome. In sports leagues, both owners and players select 
representatives to be able to concentrate their interests. For the corporate sector, 
this would imply a dominant role of shareholder representatives on compensation 
committees.66  
Regarding the applicability to specific sectors, it has to be noted that 
professional sports teams allocate large fractions of total revenues to a small 
number of employees with highly developed sector-specific skills. The process of 
collective bargaining, which has proven useful in the sports sector, may thus be 
most effective in business sectors displaying a similar personnel quality and 
salary structure, such as the investment-banking sector.  
Recent changes in executive pay policies toward more shareholder 
influence underline the relevance of the principle of collective bargaining in the 
corporate environment. The “Say on Pay” initiatives in, e.g., the US and the UK 
support this impression. These initiatives aim at introducing the right for 
shareholders to vote on executive compensation proposals and have achieved this 
in several major economies already.67 However, there is limited evidence that say 
on pay significantly alters the level and design of CEO compensation.68
Additionally, in contrast to major sports leagues, where the outcome of collective 
bargaining is binding for all teams and players, the corporate sector faces 
discussion over whether mandatory or advisory say on pay is the preferable 
alternative.69 
3.3 Collective regulatory measures can limit total compensation and, at the same 
time, secure autonomous decision-making in the corporate sector 
All North American major sports leagues operate with collective pay regulation. 
There are salary caps and luxury taxes for entire teams.70 These collective 
measures ensure the financial viability of team operations because they determine 
total salary spending. At the same time, this practice allows teams (to a large 
extent) to freely allocate the total amount defined by the salary cap to individual 
66 Note that the caveat that shareholders and executives, despite engaging in something like 
collective bargaining, would not automatically include perspectives outside the scope of their 
interests, also holds in the case of fully independent compensation committees (see Bebchuk and 
Spamann 2010). 
67 Cavanagh and Sadler 2009; Dew-Becker 2009; Conyon and Sadler 2010. 
68 Conyon and Sadler 2010. 
69 Dew-Becker 2009; Bebchuk and Spamann 2010. 
70 Individual pay regulation only occurs, when a league allows exceptions to the collective 
measure and there is the danger of excessive individual player salaries. 
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players.71 An NFL team, for example, might invest the full amount of the salary 
cap in the quarterback and employ cheap players for all other positions. At 
another extreme, it might pay each player an identical salary. In general, given 
constraints such as the availability of talent, conformity to league rules about 
acquiring players of opponents, and other side restrictions, teams are free to make 
their optimal decisions.  
However, this freedom of salary distribution does not lead to arbitrariness 
in a team’s decision-making. Teams consider different aspects such as their 
league standing, fan demand and advertisers’ preference for team success and star 
players when they make their decisions on how much to spend on whom.72
Consequently, the freedom of allocation of the salary cap in general does not lead 
to extreme allocations and is also an important instrument for teams to adjust to 
the preferences of their stakeholders.73 
Individual athlete performance is observable and quantifiable, which is an 
important determinant of the effectiveness of collective pay regulation in 
professional team sports. Consequently, as there are no incentives to shirk when 
compensation includes continuous information on the past marginal product, the 
largest proportion of players’ compensation comes from their base salaries;74
performance-related pay only constitutes a small percentage of player salaries.75 
Athletes earn their contracted salary independent of their scoring average or their 
teams’ win percentage. One vital extrinsic incentive for athletes to perform well is 
related to long-term career concerns: strong performance improves a player’s 
bargaining power in future contracts. The weight of this incentive, in combination 
with intrinsic competitive motivation and other financial benefits related to 
commercial endorsements, renders performance-based pay apart from fixed 
salaries less necessary.76 These observations have two consequences on collective 
regulation: players do not have incentives for shirking under collective regulation, 
and regulation is facilitated because compensation arrangements have a simple 
structure. Experience from major sports leagues implies that collective salary 
regulation limits excessive compensation and at the same time preserves teams’ 
autonomy in allocating individual compensation.  
The insights on collective pay regulation in professional team sports can 
be transferred to the corporate sector. Just as athletic competition ensures that a 
quarterback has strong teammates, executive pay would not be concentrated on a 
single individual, neglecting other positions in executive boards. Instead, a 
71 Staudohar 1998. 
72 Scully 1974; Scully 2004. 
73 Frick et al. 2003; DeBrock, Hendricks and Koenker 2004. 
74 In analogy to Fama 1980. 
75 Kaplan and O'Reilly 2008; Mondello and Maxcy 2009. 
76 Krautmann and Oppenheimer 2002. 
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collective salary cap enables an allocation of compensation aligned with each 
firm’s objectives. If regulators dictated a corporation how much to spend on each 
executive, this would eliminate the corporation’s capacity to act optimally 
contingent on the market situation and inhibit its ability to address agency 
problems.77 The regulator, apart from the regulation objective, has to consider this 
dependence of corporations on their autonomy.78 Collective instead of individual 
regulatory arrangements, for example by imposing a cap on bonus pools for 
executives in corporations, could therefore be a less restrictive alternative of 
regulating executive pay. 
Although the individual performance of executives is difficult to measure, 
performance-pay constitutes a substantial fraction of total compensation.79
Collective pay regulation, for example a limit on a corporation’s bonus pool, 
would not infringe this practice. However, the interaction of little transparency of 
performance and collective regulation implies difficulties in the corporate sector: 
the allocation of regulated pay would lead to increased conflicts over who 
receives what fraction of the capped bonus pool. As opposed to professional 
sports teams, where the performance of individual athletes is very transparent, 
these conflicts are intensified by the difficulty to measure individual performance 
in the corporate sector. Additionally, individual executive’s ability to appropriate 
rents from a collective pool would not necessarily coincide with the executive’s 
contribution to firm performance.80  
In the discussion of collective pay regulation it is important to note that, in 
contrast to professional team sports, there is no fixed size of executive boards. 
Consequently, adequate collective regulatory measures for different sizes of 
executive boards are necessary to guarantee uniform treatment of individual 
firms. The regulator has to consider the resulting room for manipulation, because 
corporations could appoint dummy members of the executive board to mitigate 
regulatory restrictions, for example.  
Experience from major sports leagues shows that collective regulatory 
arrangements can limit excessive compensation. It is not straightforward to see, 
whether they can also incentivize executives to take fewer decisions with negative 
externalities on society. Individual measures can achieve this objective more 
accurately. However, they strongly impair corporations’ autonomy in setting 
executive pay. This autonomy is vital for corporations, therefore collective pay 
regulation in professional team sports can yield important insights for the 
regulation of executive compensation in the corporate sector.   
77 Eisenhardt 1989; Carpenter and Sanders 2002. 
78 Cyert, Kang and Kumar 2002. 
79 Murphy 1999. 
80 Bebchuk et al. 2002. 
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3.4 Pay regulation contingent on performance with retained compensation 
correcting for substandard performance reduces focus on short run 
In the major leagues, pay regulation in the form of salary caps and luxury taxes of 
both absolute and relative nature can be found. An absolute salary cap can be 
understood as a limit to compensation defined independently of financial 
performance, i.e. it is a fixed amount of money. A relative salary cap, the 
predominant form of salary regulation, can be defined as the proportion of a 
financial statistic such as revenue or profits. In this case, financial indicators 
determine the actual extent of the regulatory measure. In the major leagues, salary 
caps for entire teams are set relative to projected league revenues of the current 
season.81 For instance, in the NBA, teams and players have agreed upon a payroll 
cap for each team of 57% of projected basketball-related income of the league 
(BRI, i.e., gate revenues, TV contracts, merchandizing, and others), divided by 
the 30 teams in the league. In the MLB, as another example, the luxury tax 
threshold is independent of revenues.  
Salary caps for individual players, as they exist in the NBA, can be 
relative or absolute in nature. The individual salary cap for an NBA player is 
contingent on the number of years he has played in the league and also depends 
on the payroll cap. The longer a player’s tenure in the NBA, the higher is his 
individual cap. Additionally, the cap is either a fixed amount or a percentage of 
the payroll cap, whichever figure is higher. Note that in the past, the fixed amount 
was always smaller than the percentage of the total payroll. This shows that 
absolute salary caps do exist but are not binding if there is a choice between an 
absolute and a relative cap. The other North American major leagues considered 
in this work show analogous patterns with respect to the choice between absolute 
and relative salary caps. 
The dominance of salary caps defined as a proportion of total league 
revenues stems from a number of advantages: a salary cap of this form aligns 
team owner and player interests, because players face less restrictive caps when 
the league is more successful financially. At the same time, this practice ensures a 
league’s financial viability because salary payments are limited to a proportion of 
total earnings. Additionally, if total earnings fall short of projections, there are 
mechanisms that ensure that teams do not have to pay salaries that exceed their 
actual earnings. For example, the so-called escrow system allows the NBA’s 
teams to withhold eight to ten percent of player salaries until actual BRI is known. 
The withheld money in the league’s escrow account is only paid to the players if 
BRI meets projections and can therefore be considered as a form of retained 
earnings.   
81 Marburger 2006; Dietl et al. 2009. 
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In the corporate sector, opinions diverge over whether executive pay 
should be capped at a certain absolute amount or whether it should be capped 
relative to a company’s earnings. The Obama administration discussed a $500,000 
salary cap on yearly cash compensation for executives in firms receiving TARP 
funds, and imposed a limit on restricted stock incentive pay at one-third of total 
annual compensation.82 The heads of state of the United Kingdom, France and 
Germany have discussed the introduction of salary caps for executives, which are 
determined relative to a company’s revenues.  
The dependency of pay arrangements on performance measures influences 
risk-taking behavior. Excessive risk-taking by executives and the related lack of 
consideration for future consequences of present decisions is a vital topic in 
current discussion over executive compensation.83 Major sports leagues imply that 
pay regulation should refer to actual performance, but also that the regulator 
should be able to adapt pay levels in cases where overall sector performance is 
below expectations. In the case of professional team sports, a salary cap that 
allows for stricter limits if league revenues turn out lower than projected ensures 
financial viability of present and future operations.  
In the corporate sector, different forms of compensation, e.g., stock 
options and restricted stock with vesting schedules, can serve the purpose of 
holding executives accountable for their decisions in future periods. 
Consequently, firms award stock options and restricted stock despite the increased 
cost of awarding risky future claims to executives.84 Several attributes of such 
forms of deferred compensation underline the potential value of considering the 
insights from the escrow system in major sports leagues. Stock options can yield 
incentives to account for the future impact of executives’ decisions, for example, 
via their vesting periods, and therefore can be considered a type of retained 
compensation. However, they also entail consequences that are not in the interest 
of shareholders and taxpayers.85 The popularity of stock options has decreased in 
the recent past, and firms have increased the use of restricted stock.86 Vesting 
periods for restricted stock have been shown to be smaller in firms with less 
effective corporate governance.87 It has also been noted that restricted stock can 
82 See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. 
83 Bebchuk and Spamann 2010; Faulkender et al. 2010; Walker 2010. 
84 See Core et al. 2003, for an overview. 
85 See Murphy 1999, for example. Among others, options induce riskier investments because they 
increase in value with higher stock-price volatility. Additionally, options lose their incentive effect 
once the stock price is small enough to yield an exercising of the option unattractive, which has 
resulted in controversy over the re-pricing of options and related incentive effects (Acharya, John 
and Sundaram 2000; Core et al. 2003). 
86 Carter, Lynch and Tuna 2007. 
87 Chi and Johnson 2008. 
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incentivize excessive risk-taking if it is issued as common (as opposed to 
preferred) stock.88 
Following these observations we can summarize that while the escrow 
system in professional sports leagues imposes identical restrictions on all teams 
and athletes, the long-term incentives of restricted stock in part depend on 
individual firms’ governance and accounting procedures. Additionally, there is a 
difference in scope between restricted stock and the escrow system in sports: 
while all teams and athletes are confronted by the escrow system, only about two 
thirds of the S&P 1,500 Index firms award restricted stock, mostly R&D intensive 
firms.89,90 Regarding the design of future risky claims in the corporate sector, it 
has to be added that apart from the objective of aligning the incentives of 
shareholders and executives, stock options and restricted stock frequently are used 
as a result of accounting and tax motivations.91 This observation poses the 
question, to what extent the current design of such forms of compensation meets 
the objective of overcoming myopia in executives’ decision-making.     
An important point in discussing the transferability of insights on retained 
compensation from sports to the corporate sector are the different time horizons 
over which executives and athletes influence their respective organization’s 
success. Athletes’ actions almost exclusively affect their teams’ short-term 
performance, and via the escrow system, they are also held accountable for their 
performance over the corresponding time period. In contrast, corporate 
executives’ decisions can influence firm performance for years. The sports 
industry, where athletes receive the escrow pay after actual realization of overall 
outcome, implies that the period of time for which the regulator retains a 
percentage of earnings, should depend on the permanence of executive decisions. 
The longer the effects of decisions persist in the future, the longer the period of 
maintaining an equivalent to the escrow account should turn out. The transfer of 
insights from professional team sports to the corporate sector in this regard is 
limited to the extent that the different horizons, over which athletes and 
executives influence their organizations, generate different implications for 
compensation. For example, there can be a discount that executives apply to 
retained compensation, because the payoff occurs at a future date.92 Such 
discounts imply that higher levels of compensation are necessary to retain 
executives and maintain incentives, in particular because not all firms use retained 
88 Bebchuk and Spamann 2010. 
89 Murphy 1999; Blouin and Carter 2010. 
90 A similarly low presence holds for long-term incentive plans, based on the rolling average of 
cumulative performance, for example. 
91 Core et al. 2003. 
92 For example, Kahl, Liu and Longstaff 2003 show the costs stockholders associate with 
restrictions on the ability to sell awarded stock. 
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compensation. Uniform treatment of retained compensation across firms, 
potentially with reference to their particular sector, would mitigate the pressure to 
compensate executives for lagged payoffs, and would effect that the realization of 
firm performance and executive compensation converged. One major challenge 
for such a measure is defining the time period over which compensation should be 
retained, as well as the fraction of compensation that should be retained.  
3.5 Luxury taxes lead to higher efficiency of talent allocation than salary caps 
The major leagues show different approaches to the limitation of player salaries, 
involving both salary caps and luxury taxes. The NFL, for example, operates with 
a salary cap. The league has to approve all contracts between a team and a player; 
therefore, the salary cap cannot be exceeded. The MLB, on the other hand, 
operates with a luxury tax. In the NBA, a combination of a salary cap and a 
luxury tax is in place. If a team’s payroll for players exceeds the luxury tax 
threshold, which is set above the salary cap, it has to pay a tax to the league for 
the overage. These examples show that in professional sports, the different 
measures achieve similar objectives.93  
A salary cap sets a strict limit on total compensation per team or per 
player. As a result, teams’ expenditures on talent converge. This leads to more 
competitive balance, but also to an inefficient allocation of talent. Players do not 
necessarily play for the team where their marginal productivity yields the highest 
return. In leagues with comparatively few games per season (e.g., an NFL team 
has 16 regular season games), the inefficient allocation of talent does not lead to 
forgone revenues. Almost all teams sell out all games. Other leagues have many 
more games, an MLB team, for example, has 162 regular season games. 
Consequently, it is more difficult to fill the stadium at every game, especially in 
large markets where alternatives abound. Large-market teams have to field stars 
to fill their stadia. In terms of the allocation of players with respect to their 
marginal return, these leagues require higher efficiency, i.e., the best players 
should play in the largest markets. Under the MLB’s luxury tax, rich teams can 
spend more on players than small teams, with the restraint that a luxury tax 
accrues. Given that large-market teams have a higher marginal return on talent, 
this leads to a more efficient allocation of playing talent. In this sense, the luxury 
tax is economically superior to the salary cap.94 From an economic perspective, 
this could explain different regulatory regimes in different leagues.95  
Luxury taxes show another important difference to salary caps: while they 
do not imply a strict salary limit, they generate tax revenues from teams that 
93 Dietl et al. 2010. 
94 Rosen and Sanderson 2001. 
95 Scully 2004. 
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exceed the luxury tax threshold. The league can redistribute these tax revenues 
among smaller teams or use the revenues for pursuing collective league interests 
apart from balanced competition.  
Corporate executives should also earn according to their marginal product 
to ensure efficiency.96 Consequently, considering current practice in major sports 
leagues, a mechanism similar to the luxury tax in sports is preferable over a salary 
cap. A luxury tax allows pay according to an executive’s performance and the 
value the executive adds to a firm. The tax controls pay by increasing a firm’s 
cost of executive pay, therefore there is a regulating effect. Luxury tax payments 
generate resources the regulator can redistribute or save in a fund for financial 
relief programs. However, a measure like the luxury tax only makes overage 
compensation more costly and does not strictly limit it. Salary caps do not allow 
such overage and therefore facilitate regulation.  
In the US, there exists a measure similar to the luxury tax in professional 
team sports: the tax deductibility limit of US$1 million for corporations.97 A 
number of exceptions accompany the deductibility limit, thereby allowing 
corporations and executives to circumvent regulation by changing compensation 
practices. Most importantly, performance-related bonus payments are not 
included in the deductibility limit. These exceptions have resulted in a recent 
increase of different forms of performance-based pay.98 Note that this poses a 
contrast to compensation practice in professional sports, where performance 
targets are differentiated as likely and unlikely, and performance pay counts 
towards the salary cap, if the related performance target is likely to be achieved.99
Another important difference between Section 162(m) and the luxury tax in 
professional sports is the scope of the measures: while the deductibility limit is an 
individual threshold, the luxury tax in sports is a collective measure. The tax 
accrues for every dollar that a team’s payroll exceeds a specific threshold. Other 
measures, such as a 90% tax on bonuses in firms, which have accepted larger 
amounts of federal bailout funds, and charity rules to reduce connotations of 
greed also show similarities to the luxury tax in professional sports.  
There are several differences between measures found in the corporate 
sector today and the luxury tax in professional sports leagues: the luxury tax in 
team sports accrues to an aggregate measure of compensation that, in contrast to 
the corporate sector, comprises all pay except for the (almost negligible) fraction 
made up by unlikely to be achieved performance pay. Further, the luxury tax in 
96 Fama 1980. 
97 Section 162(m), IRC. 
98 Hall and Murphy 2003. 
99 Of the (small) proportion of variable athlete compensation, the fraction of incentive pay for 
unlikely to be achieved performance targets is small, and capped at 25% of a player’s total salary 
in the NBA, for example.  
21
Dietl et al.: Executive Pay Regulation: Lessons from Major Sports Leagues
professional sports, in contrast to similar measures in the corporate sector, is a 
collective measure applied to entire teams as opposed to individuals. Finally, in 
sports, the luxury tax proceeds are used for supporting sector-specific objectives.  
A transfer of these attributes of a luxury tax to the regulation of the 
corporate sector could limit the extent of shifting compensation elements towards 
tax loopholes and tax proceeds could be invested in industry stability funds. 
Additionally, the implications derived for collective regulatory measures 
discussed above, i.e., their less restrictive character, also hold for the concept of a 
luxury tax.  
3.6 Soft salary caps can impede regulation, but also reward experience and 
successful careers 
In professional team sports, the design of salary caps can take on two forms with 
respect to the rigor of the cap. A salary cap can be hard, that is, fixed and without 
exceptions, or it can be soft, that is, it can be adapted under specific 
circumstances. Hard salary caps in sports leagues ensure equal opportunities for 
competitors. Opponents may freely compete for players subject to the uniform 
salary cap. All competitors in a league face the same salary cap. Soft salary caps 
allow for individual exceptions to the salary limit under certain conditions. Teams 
can thus adapt to specific circumstances and spend more on very important and 
experienced players, for example. Soft salary caps are a less effective measure 
because exceptions are possible, and affected parties will try to exploit all 
available exceptions in their favor.  
In the major leagues, hard caps as well as soft caps can be found. The 
NFL, for instance, has a hard cap, meaning that total salaries paid in a season have 
to be below a certain limit. Otherwise, sanctions are imposed on the team that has 
violated the salary cap. The NBA, as another example, has a soft salary cap; a soft 
cap implies that there are numerous exceptions to the general salary limits. These 
exceptions lead to a large proportion of teams exceeding the salary cap to better 
adapt to team- and player-specific requirements. The NBA makes exceptions so 
that teams can hold on to merited players when their contracts expire. One such 
exception is named after former NBA star Larry Bird. To re-sign him, his team 
had to exceed the salary cap. As a consequence, the exception was introduced that 
a team could re-sign star players who either had played a number of years without 
being waived (i.e., fired) or had not changed teams as a free agent. If these 
conditions hold, the contract does not count towards the salary cap. This so-called 
“Bird exception” awards the privilege of retaining franchise players. Other 
exceptions, such as the “Early Bird” and “Non-Bird” exceptions, are installed, 
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which allow moderate salary growth to players who have not been waived for two 
consecutive seasons or remain with their original team.100  
Exceptions reduce the effectiveness of regulatory interventions. Where 
they apply, they relax the restrictions of installed regulations. This can undermine 
the regulatory mechanism to a degree where it becomes virtually ineffective, as 
the case of the NBA has shown. For example, Michael Jordan earned salaries of 
more than US$ 30m per season, where his salary alone would have exceeded the 
team salary cap. He signed these contracts under the Larry Bird exception, 
therefore they never counted towards the cap. Today, the NBA has eliminated this 
loophole by installing an individual salary cap.  
For executive compensation such loopholes would have similar 
consequences and discredit the regulation attempt. The specific case of Section 
162(m), IRC has shown how the definition of a regulatory measure can affect 
compensation practices and cause shifts from one way of compensation to 
another.101 However, exceptions also allow the adaptation to specific 
circumstances and may therefore be used as incentives. In some major sports 
leagues, merited players face softer regulation than others.102 Similarly, 
experienced company executives with a solid career could face less restrictive 
salary caps. Just as this practice has incentive effects in professional sports, such 
an exception could also incentivize present and future executives to invest in 
continuous performance to be able to obtain exception status in the future. This 
way, pay regulation would shift a larger fraction of compensation for executives 
to the future, and regulation would reflect a seniority principle beyond current 
compensation practices.103 Salary caps could therefore effect to render short-term-
oriented, risk-taking behavior less attractive to executives.  
With the introduction of pay regulation in the corporate sector, the 
discussion of potentially relevant exceptions assumes increasing relevance. 
Current practice in professional sports incorporates the experience gained over 
several decades of pay regulation. Regarding the discussion of executive pay 
regulation, it can therefore serve as an indicator of future challenges for the 
regulator. 
100 For a comprehensive overview on exceptions to the NBA salary cap, see Hill and Groothuis 
2001. 
101 Hall and Murphy 2003. 
102 In the NBA, the individual salary cap for a player becomes less restrictive, the longer a player 
has active in the league, for example.  
103 See Hutchens 1989, for example. 
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4. Conclusion 
The regulation of executive compensation is currently widely discussed by 
regulators, shareholders, and managers. Fundamental economic analysis of the 
use and potential consequences of executive pay regulation is necessary to 
adequately account for this discussion. As one potential starting point for this 
research, professional team sports leagues provide a unique laboratory for 
deriving insights on the introduction, workings, and consequences of the 
regulation of executive compensation. We transfer these valuable insights to an 
analysis of executive pay regulation and illustrate what politicians, regulators, and 
economists can learn from major sports leagues. Key implications relate to the 
introduction, determination, and effects of salary caps and luxury taxes, the 
comparative advantages of hard and soft salary caps and of luxury taxes as an 
alternative to salary caps, as well as the rigor and enforcement of these regulatory 
mechanisms. 
By deriving implications from major sports leagues, we want to contribute 
to the discussion of executive pay regulation. We see our contribution as a new 
perspective, which merits attention because of the success and the long tradition 
of salary caps and luxury taxes in professional sports, as well as the numerous 
parallels between star athletes and corporate executives. However, we are aware 
that the discussion of insights cannot take place without taking the economic 
peculiarities of professional team sports into account and pointing out the 
institutional differences between professional team sports and the corporate 
sector. By accounting for the idiosyncrasies of the professional team sports 
industry, we obtain valuable insights on the extent to which pay regulation 
practices from sports can and cannot be transferred to the corporate sector. The 
analysis enriches the discussion of measures to regulate executive compensation 
with a new perspective. 
5. References 
Acharya, V., P. Wachtel and I. Walter. 2009. "International Alignment of 
Financial Sector Regulation." In Restoring Financial Stability: How to 
Repair a Failed System, edited by V. Acharya and M. Richardson. 
Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. 
Acharya, V.V., K. John and R.K. Sundaram. 2000. "On the Optimality of 
Resetting Executive Stock Options." Journal of Financial Economics 57 
(1): 65-101. 
Aggarwal, R. 2008. "Executive Compensation and Incentives." In Handbook of 
Empirical Corporate Finance, edited by B. E. Eckbo. Elsevier Science 
Ltd. 
24
Business and Politics, Vol. 13 [2011], Iss. 2, Art. 6
DOI: 10.2202/1469-3569.1357
Akerlof, G. 1976. "The Economics of Caste and the Rat Race and Other Woeful 
Tales." Quarterly Journal of Economics 90: 599-617. 
Arnaut, J. 2006. Independent European Sport Review. Nyon: UEFA. 
Bebchuk, L. A. and H. Spamann. 2010. "Regulating Bankers' Pay." Georgetown 
Law Journal 98 (2): 247-87. 
Bebchuk, L. and J. Fried. 2003. "Executive Compensation as an Agency 
Problem." Journal of Economic Perspectives 17 (3): 71-92. 
Bebchuk, L. and J. Fried. 2006. "Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled 
Promise of Executive Compensation." Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press. 
Bebchuk, L., J. Fried and D. Walker. 2002. "Managerial Power and Rent 
Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation." University of 
Chicago Law Review 69: 751-846. 
Bloom, M. 1999. "The Performance Effects of Pay Dispersion on Individuals and 
Organizations." Academy of Management Journal 42 (1): 25-40. 
Blouin, J.L. and M.E. Carter. 2010. "The Economics of Restricted Stock and the 
Section 83 (B) Election." SSRN Working Paper 1561923. University of 
Pennsylvania. 
Borland, J. and R. MacDonald. 2003. "The Demand for Sports." Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy 19: 478-502. 
Brookman, J.T., T. Jandik and C.G. Rennie. 2006. "A Comparison of CEO 
Compensation Data Sources." Working Paper. University of Arkansas. 
Bushman, R. M., R. J. Indjejikian and A. Smith. 1996. "CEO Compensation: The 
Role of Individual Performance Evaluation." Journal of Accounting and 
Economics 21 (2): 161-93. 
Carpenter, M. and W. Sanders. 2002. "Top Management Team Compensation: 
The Missing Link between CEO Pay and Firm Performance?" Strategic 
Management Journal 23 (4): 367-75. 
Carter, M.E., L.J. Lynch and I. Tuna. 2007. "The Role of Accounting in the 
Design of CEO Equity Compensation." Accounting Review 82 (2): 327-
357. 
Cavanagh, M. and G. Sadler. 2009. "Shareholder Voting and Directors' 
Remuneration Report Legislation: Say on Pay in the UK (CRI 2009-004)." 
Compensation Research Initiative. 
Chatov, R. 1975. "Corporate Financial Reporting: Public or Private Control?". 
New York: Free Press. 
Cheung, S. 1983. "The Contractual Nature of the Firm." Journal of Law and 
Economics. 26 (1): 1-21. 
Chhaochharia, V. and Y. Grinstein. 2007. "Corporate Governance and Firm 
Value: The Impact of the 2002 Governance Rules." Journal of Finance 62 
(4): 1789-825. 
25
Dietl et al.: Executive Pay Regulation: Lessons from Major Sports Leagues
Chi, J. and S.A. Johnson. 2008. "The Value of Vesting Restrictions on Managerial 
Stock and Option Holdings." SSRN Working Paper 1136298. Arizona 
State University and Texas A&M University. 
Clayton, M. and D. Yermack. 2001. "Major League Baseball Player Contracts: 
An Investigation of the Empirical Properties of Real Options." SSRN 
Working Paper 1297052. New York University. 
Conyon, M. and G. Sadler. 2010. "Shareholder Voting and Directors 
Remuneration Report Legislation: Say on Pay in the UK." AAA 2010 
Management Accounting Section (MAS) Meeting Paper. 
Core, J.; W. Guay and D. Larcker. 2003. "Executive Equity Compensation and 
Incentives: A Survey." Economic Policy Review 9 (1): 27-50. 
Corrigan, E.G. 1982. "Are Banks Special?" Annual Report, Federal Reserve Bank 
of Minneapolis. 
Cyert, R.; S. Kang and P. Kumar. 2002. "Corporate Governance, Takeovers, and 
Top-Management Compensation: Theory and Evidence." Management 
Science 48 (4): 453-69. 
De Jong, A.; D. V. DeJong; G. Mertens and C. E. Wasley. 2005. "The Role of 
Self-Regulation in Corporate Governance: Evidence and Implications 
from the Netherlands." Journal of Corporate Finance 11 (3): 473-503. 
DeBrock, L.; W. Hendricks and R. Koenker. 2004. "Pay and Performance: The 
Impact of Salary Distribution on Firm-Level Outcomes in Baseball." 
Journal of Sports Economics 5 (3): 243-261. 
Deloitte and Touche. 2009. "Annual Review of Football Finance," London: 
Deloitte. 
Devers, C.; A. Cannella; G. Reilly and M. Yoder. 2007. "Executive 
Compensation: A Multidisciplinary Review of Recent Developments." 
Journal of Management, 33 (6): 1016-72. 
Dew-Becker, I. 2009. "How Much Sunlight Does It Take to Disinfect a 
Boardroom? A Short History of Executive Compensation Regulation in 
America." CESifo Economic Studies 55 (3-4): 434-57. 
Dietl, H. and E. Franck. 2007. "Governance Failure and Financial Crisis in 
German Football." Journal of Sports Economics 8 (6): 662-69. 
Dietl, H., E. Franck and M. Lang. 2008. "Overinvestment in Team Sports 
Leagues: A Contest Theory Model." Scottish Journal of Political Economy 
55 (3): 353-68. 
Dietl, H. M., E. Franck; M. Lang and A. Rathke. 2011 (forthcoming). "Salary Cap 
Regulation in Professional Team Sports." Contemporary Economic Policy. 
Dietl, H, E. Franck and S. Nüesch. 2006. "Are Voluntary Salary Cap Agreements 
Self-Enforcing?" European Sport Management Quarterly 6: 23-34. 
26
Business and Politics, Vol. 13 [2011], Iss. 2, Art. 6
DOI: 10.2202/1469-3569.1357
Dietl, H., M. Lang and A. Rathke. 2009. "The Effect of Salary Caps in 
Professional Team Sports on Social Welfare." B.E. Journal of Economic 
Analysis and Policy 9 (1) Article 17. 
Dietl, H., M. Lang and S. Werner. 2010. "The Effect of Luxury Taxes on Social 
Welfare in Team Sports Leagues." International Journal of Sport Finance
5 (1): 41-51. 
Dietl, Helmut M., Markus Lang and Alexander Rathke. 2011. "The Combined 
Effect of Salary Restrictions and Revenue Sharing in Sports Leagues." 
Economic Inquiry 49 (2): 447-63. 
Dobson, S. and J. Goddard. 2001. The Economics of Football. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Duggan, M. and SD Levitt. 2002. "Winning Isn't Everything: Corruption in Sumo 
Wrestling." The American Economic Review, 92 (5): 1594-605. 
Eisenhardt, K. 1989. "Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review." Academy of 
Management Review, 14 (1): 57-74. 
Fama, E. 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm." Journal of 
Political Economy, 88 (2): 288-307. 
Faulkender, M., D. Kadyrzhanova; N. Prabhala and L. Senbet. 2010. "Executive 
Compensation: An Overview of Research on Corporate Practices and 
Proposed Reforms." Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 22 (1): 107-18. 
Flynn, M. and R. Gilbert. 2001. "The Analysis of Professional Sports Leagues as 
Joint Ventures." Economic Journal 111: F27-F46. 
Fort, R. 2003. Sports Economics. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Fort, R. and Y. Lee. 2007. "Structural Change, Competitive Balance, and the Rest 
of the Major Leagues." Economic Inquiry 45 (3): 519-32. 
Fort, R. and J. Quirk. 1995. "Cross-Subsidization, Incentives, and Outcomes in 
Professional Team Sports Leagues." Journal of Economic Literature 33: 
1265-99. 
Franck, E. 2003. "Beyond Market Power: Efficiency Explanations for the Basic 
Structures of North American Major League Organizations." European 
Sport Management Quarterly 3 (4): 221-39. 
Franck, E. and S. Nüesch. Forthcoming. "The Effect of Wage Dispersion on Team 
Outcome and the Way Team Outcome Is Produced." Applied Economics. 
Frick, B.; J. Prinz and K. Winkelmann. 2003. "Pay Inequalities and Team 
Performance: Empirical Evidence from the North American Major 
Leagues." International Journal of Manpower 24: 472-88. 
Garner, J. and W. Kim. 2010. "Does a Salary Cap Really Work? What the U.S. 
Can Learn from Korean Evidence." SSRN Working Paper 1546783. 
Gibbons, R. and K. Murphy. 1992. "Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence 
of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence." Journal of Political Economy
100 (3): 468-505. 
27
Dietl et al.: Executive Pay Regulation: Lessons from Major Sports Leagues
Gomez-Mejia, Luis and Robert M. Wiseman. 1997. "Reframing Executive 
Compensation: An Assessment and Outlook." Journal of Management 23 
(3): 291-374. 
Gunningham, N. 1991. "Private Ordering, Self-Regulation and Futures Markets: 
A Comparative Study of Informal Social Control." Law & Policy 13 (4): 
297-326. 
Gunningham, N. and J. Rees. 1997. "Industry Self-Regulation: An Institutional 
Perspective." Law & Policy 19 (4): 363-414. 
Hall, B.J. and K.J. Murphy. 2003. "The Trouble with Stock Options." Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 17 (3): 49-70. 
Heubeck, T. and J. Scheuer. 2003. "Incentive Clauses in Players’ Contracts in 
Team Sports-Theory and Practice." German Working Papers in Law and 
Economics 2003 (1): 1-30. 
Hill, J. and P. Groothuis. 2001. "The New NBA Collective Bargaining 
Agreement, the Median Voter Model, and a Robin Hood Rent 
Redistribution." Journal of Sports Economics 2 (2): 131-44. 
Holmstrom, Bengt. 1982. "Moral Hazard in Teams." Bell Journal of Economics 
13 (2): 324-40. 
Hutchens, R. M. 1989. "Seniority, Wages and Productivity: A Turbulent Decade." 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 3 (4): 49-64. 
Jacobs, M. and R. Winter. 1971. "Antitrust Principles and Collective Bargaining 
by Athletes: Of Superstars in Peonage." Yale Law Journal 81 (1): 1-29. 
Jensen, M. and K. Murphy. 1990. "Performance Pay and Top-Management 
Incentives." Journal of Political Economy 98 (2): 225-64. 
Kahl, M., J. Liu and F.A. Longstaff. 2003. "Paper Millionaires: How Valuable Is 
Stock to a Stockholder Who Is Restricted from Selling It?" Journal of 
Financial Economics 67 (3): 385-410. 
Kahn, L. 2000. "The Sports Business as a Labor Market Laboratory." Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 14 (3): 75-94. 
Kaplan, A. and N.J. O'Reilly. 2008. "The CEO - Star Athlete Analogy: The Role 
of Variable Compensation in Professional Sport." International Journal of 
Sport Management and Marketing 3 (4): 358-73. 
Kaplan, R. 2004. "The NBA Luxury Tax Model: A Misguided Regulatory 
Regime." Columbia Law Review, 104 (6): 1615-50. 
Kaufman, G.G. 1994. "Bank Contagion: A Review of the Theory and Evidence." 
Journal of Financial Services Research 8 (2): 123-50. 
Késenne, S. 2000. "The Impact of Salary Caps in Professional Team Sports." 
Scottish Journal of Political Economy 47: 422-30. 
Késenne, S. 2007. The Economic Theory of Professional Team Sports - an 
Analytical Treatment. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. 
28
Business and Politics, Vol. 13 [2011], Iss. 2, Art. 6
DOI: 10.2202/1469-3569.1357
Knutt, N. 2005. "Executive Compensation Regulation: Corporate America, Heal 
Thyself." Arizona Law Review 47: 493-517. 
Krautmann, A. and M. Oppenheimer. 2002. "Contract Length and the Return to 
Performance in Major League Baseball." Journal of Sports Economics 36 
(1): 6-17. 
Lazear, E.P. 1995. Personnel Economics. MIT Press Books. 
Leitner, Y. 2005. "Financial Networks: Contagion, Commitment, and Private 
Sector Bailouts." Journal of Finance 60 (6): 2925-53. 
Levitt, S.D. 2002. "Testing the Economic Model of Crime: The National Hockey 
League's Two-Referee Experiment." B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & 
Policy 1 (1) Article 2. 
Lo, K. 2003. "Economic Consequences of Regulated Changes in Disclosure: The 
Case of Executive Compensation." Journal of Accounting and Economics
35 (3): 285-314. 
Marburger, D. 1997. "Gate Revenue Sharing and Luxury Taxes in Professional 
Sports." Contemporary Economic Policy 15: 114-23. 
Marburger, D. 2006. "Chasing the Elusive Salary Cap." In Handbook on the 
Economics of Sport, edited by W. Andreff and S. Szymanski. Cheltenham, 
UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
Mondello, M. and J. Maxcy. 2009. "The Impact of Salary Dispersion and 
Performance Bonuses in NFL Organizations." Management Decision 47 
(1): 110-23. 
Murphy, K. 1985. "Corporate Performance and Managerial Remuneration: An 
Empirical Analysis." Journal of Accounting and Economics 7 (1-3): 11-42. 
Murphy, K. 1986. "Incentives, Learning, and Compensation: A Theoretical and 
Empirical Investigation of Managerial Labor Contracts." RAND Journal of 
Economics 17 (1): 59-76. 
Murphy, K. 1999. "Executive Compensation." In Handbook of Labor Economics, 
edited by O. Ashenfelter and D. Card. New York: North Holland. 
Neale, W. 1964. "The Peculiar Economics of Professional Sports: A Contribution 
to the Theory of the Firm in Sporting Competition and in Market 
Competition." Quarterly Journal of Economics, 78: 1-14. 
Posner, R.A. 2009. "Are American CEOs Overpaid, and, If So, What If Anything 
Should Be Done About It?" Duke Law Journal, 58: 1013-47. 
Quirk, J. 1997. "The Salary Cap and the Luxury Tax: Affirmative Action 
Programs for Weak-Drawing Franchises." In Stee-Rike Four!: What's 
Wrong with the Business of Baseball? Edited by D. Marburger. Westport, 
CT: Greenwood Publishing Group. 
Romer, D. 2006. "Do Firms Maximize? Evidence from Professional Football." 
Journal of Political Economy 114 (2): 340-65. 
29
Dietl et al.: Executive Pay Regulation: Lessons from Major Sports Leagues
Rosen, S. and A. Sanderson. 2001. "Labour Markets in Professional Sports." 
Economic Journal 111 (469): 47-68. 
Rosner, S. and K. L. Shropshire. 2004. "The Business of Sports." Sudbury, MA: 
Jones & Bartlett Publishers. 
Rottenberg, S. 1956. "The Baseball Players' Labor Market." Journal of Political 
Economy 64: 242-58. 
Scully, G. 1974. "Pay and Performance in Major League Baseball." American 
Economic Review 64: 915-30. 
Scully, G. W. 2004. "Player Salary Share and the Distribution of Player 
Earnings." Managerial and Decision Economics 25 (2): 77-86. 
Staudohar, P. 1998. "Salary Caps in Professional Team Sports." Compensation 
and Working Conditions 3: 3-11.  
Staudohar, P. 1999. "Labor Relations in Basketball: The Lockout of 1998-99." 
Monthly Labor Review 122 (4): 3-9. 
Staudohar, P. 2005. "The Hockey Lockout of 2004-05." Monthly Labor Review 
128: 23-29. 
Szymanski, S. 2001. "Income Inequality, Competitive Balance and the 
Attractiveness of Team Sports: Some Evidence and a Natural Experiment 
from English Soccer." Economic Journal 111 (469): 69-84. 
Szymanski, S. 2003. "The Assessment: The Economics of Sport." Oxford Review 
of Economic Policy 19 (4): 467-77. 
Walker, D.I. 2010. "The Challenge of Improving the Long-Term Focus of 
Executive Pay." SSRN Working Paper 1396663. Boston University 
School of Law. 
Whitney, J. 1993. "Bidding Till Bankrupt: Destructive Competition in 
Professional Team Sports." Economic Inquiry 31: 100-15. 
Wolfe, R.A., K.E. Weick, J.M. Usher, J.R. Terborg, L. Poppo, A.J. Murrell, J.M. 
Dukerich, D.C. Core, K.E. Dickson and J.S. Jourdan. 2005. "Sport and 
Organizational Studies." Journal of Management Inquiry 14 (2): 182-210. 
30
Business and Politics, Vol. 13 [2011], Iss. 2, Art. 6
DOI: 10.2202/1469-3569.1357
